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THE REQUIREMENT OF MUTALITY IN PATENT CASES
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
402 U.S. 313 (1971)
The University of Illinois Foundation brought a patent infringement
suit against Blonder-Tongue Laboratories. The trial court's determina-
tion that the patent was valid and infringed was affirmed on appeal'
despite a pre-existing invalidity ruling in a different circuit.' The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari3 to resolve the conflicting validity deter-
minations and to determine whether Blonder-Tongue should be able to
plead the earlier ruling to estop plaintiff patentee.' Held: A defendant to
a patent infringement suit may assert, 5 for collateral estoppel purposes,
a prior invalidity ruling to which he was neither a party nor privy.
The public's desire for conclusiveness of litigation gave rise to various
doctrines to serve that interest. Res judicata is a judically formulated
defense7 that provides claim conclusiveness to a final valid judgment. 8
The defense applies to all issues and other matters that were raised or
I. University of Illinois Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc., 422 F.2d 769 (7th
Cir. 1970).
2. University of Illinois Foundation v. Winegard Co., 271 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Iowa 1967), afjfd,
402 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1968).
3. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 400 U.S. 864 (1970).
4. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 317
(1971).
After granting certiorari, the Court requested the parties discuss whether a patent invalidity
ruling should be permitted to be asserted as res judicata against the patentee by a defendant who
was neither a party or privy to the invalidity ruling. This request put in issue the continued
adherence to Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
5. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses that will be lost if not pleaded.
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). The Court added that on remand Blonder-Tongue would be permitted to
amend its answer to assert a plea of estoppel. 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
6. Moschzisker, ResJudicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299 (1928).
7. The concept of conclusiveness of litigation dates back to Roman law, W. BUCKLAND, TEX-
BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 690-92 (1921). See also Dutchess of Kingston's Case, 3 Smith, Lead. Cas.
1998 (9th ed. 1776).
8. Vestal, Preclusion Res Judicata Variables, 50 IOWA L. REV. 27 (1964). Strictly speaking res
judicata includes the doctrines of merger and bar. If a valid and final judgment for money is
rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the cause of action is merged in the judgment and he can not
thereafter maintain a second cause of action on the original cause. RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 47 (1942). See generally lB. J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 0A05[1] (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as IB. J. MOORE].
Conversely if a valid and final in personam judgment on the merits is rendered for the defendant,
the original cause of action is thereafter barred by judgment, RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 48
(1942). See generally 1 B. J. MOORE § 0.40511]; Note, Developments in the Law Res Judicata,
65 HARV. L. REv. 818 (1952).
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could have been raised in a previous cause of action.9 Collateral estoppel
is an extension to the doctrine of res judicata.. I" Although collateral
estoppel is also a defense of conclusiveness, it applies finality only to
facts that were judicially determined and may be asserted as a defense
in a different cause of action. 1 Besides providing finality to litigation,
these doctrines also serve individual interests by providing protection
from harassment. 2
Traditionally, before a person could assert a defense of collateral
estoppel he had to be a party 3 or privy 4 to the prior judicial proceedings.
This prerequisite is known as the doctrine of mutuality. 15 It was adopted
by the federal courts" and expressly applied to patent law in Triplett v.
Lowell. 7
To effectuate the expressed purposes of collateral estoppel, courts
modified the requirement by permitting a defendant who lacked mutual-
ity to assert the defense if his alleged liability was derived from one who
had successfully defended on the merits.' 8 This exception was justified
9. See generally lB. J. MooRE § 0.40511] and see note 11 infra.
10. Vestal, supra note 8.
11. lB. J. MOORE § 0.405[1], [3]; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1877):
"... where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand,
the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or
points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict is rendered."
12. Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299 (1928).
13. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENT § 79 (1942).
14. Id. at § 83. To claim privity to a suit, one must have a mutual or successive relationship to
the same right in property that was litigated in that suit. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining
A Smelting Co., 223 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1911).
15. lB. J. MOORE § 0.412.
16. Id.
17. 297 U.S. 638 (1936). "Neither reason nor authority supports the contention that an adjudica-
tion adverse to any or all the claims of a patent precludes another suit upon the same claims against
a different defendant. While the earlier decision may by comity be given great weight in a later
litigation and thus persuade the court to render a like decree, it is not res judicata and may not be
pleaded as a defense." 297 U.S. 638, 642 (1936). An identical view was adopted in the RESTATEMiENT
OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942). The principal case relied upon Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Manufac-
turing Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900), and Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30 (1929) as
authority for denying res judicata in any case where the defendant lacked mutuality. 297 U.S. at
642. These cases are doubtful authority for that proposition. Mast concerned a validity ruling that
had not been followed in a subsequent suit; Winters did not involve a patent's validity, but whether
a patent had been infringed. In addition res judicata was not asserted by either party in Winters,
so the question of whether it would lie was not before the Court. Nickerson v. Pep Boys-Manny,
Moe & Jack, 247 F. Supp. 221, 222 (D. Del. 1965).
18. A surety can assert res judicata if the debtor has been exonerated1 Lamb v. Wahlenmaier,
144 Cal. 91, 77 P. 765 (1904); Gill v. Morris, 58 Tenn. 500 (1872); 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1010,
10 15; 57 HARV. L. REV. 98, 104-05 (1944). Whether the defense is available to indemnitors is not
yet settled. See generally IB J. MoORE § 0.412[3].
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on the grounds that it prevented a plaintiff from reopening a settled issue
merely by switching defendants. 9 This exception was recognized in pat-
ent cases involving a manufacturer-customer relationship."
In addition to these extensions, the soundness of the mutuality doc-
trine has long been questioned. 2' Under the pressure of heavy dockets,
some state courts abandoned the mutuality requirement. 22 Following this
lead many federal courts likewise abandoned the requirement. 23 This
trend was particularily evident in cases involving a federal question.24
Although the mutuality doctrine has been eroded, limits remain on its
outright rejection. Even courts that advocate the abrogation of mutual-
ity maintain the requirement when rejection might result in injustice. 5
Basically the interests served by conclusiveness must be balanced against
the time honored right of a party to have his day in court. 2
Whether mutuality is required to sustain a plea of collateral estoppel
19. Bernhard v. Bank of American Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 811, 122 P.2d
892, 895 (1942).
20. General Chem. Co. v. Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc., 101 F.2d 178,
180 (4th Cir. 1939) (manufacturers likened to principals, their customers to sureties). The exception
also covered exclusive sales agents. Warren Featherbone Co. v. DeCamp, 154 F. 198 (N.D. Ill.
1907). The argument advanced by the manufacturer was that his successful defense would be
worthless if one who purchased the product could be sued. Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285, 289
(1907). Manufacturers have also been allowed to intervene and assert res judicata in suits against
their customers. Stoehrer & Pratt Dodgem Corp. v. Glen Echo Park Co., 15 F.2d 558 (4th Cir.
1926); Continuous Extracting Press Corp. v. Eastern Cotton Oil Co., 264 F. 340 (E.D.N.C. 1920).
21. E.g.. J. BENTHAM, 7 BENTHAM'S WORKS 171 (Bowring's ed. 1843). Bentham thought the
mutuality doctrine was unreasonable and belonged on the gaming tables, not in courts of law. His
sentiments were cited with approval in the principle case, 402 U.S. at 328-29, and Bernhard v. Bank
of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942).
22. The leading case is Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). See also Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (1934);
Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937); Jenkins v.
Atlantic Coast Line, 89 S.C. 408, 71 S.E. 1010 (1911).
23. See, e.g., United States v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. & D. Nev,
1962), aff d in part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom, United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener,
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd.
v. Packard Bell Electronics Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Maryland v. Capital
Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967).
In diversity jurisdiction cases, federal courts apply the mutuality rule of the forum state. When
federal questions are involved the courts apply their own rules of res judicata. Heiser v. Woodruff,
327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946). See 402 U.S. at 325-26 n. 13; lB J. MOORE 1806 (Supp. 1970).
24. See, e.g., United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 172 F. Supp. 580, 588 (D. Conn. 1959).
See also 402 U.S. at 324 n. 12.
25. Evans and Robins, The Demise of Mutuality in Collateral Estoppel (the Second Round
Patent Suit-the Not-so-Instant Replay), 24 OKLA. L. REv. 179, 188 (197 1).
26. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,40 (1940).
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is now sometimes determined by an accommodation of the various com-
peting interests. As the Fifth Circuit in Rachal v. Hill27 stated:
"While the requirement of mutuality need no longer be met, the doctrine
of collateral estoppel will not be applied unless it appears that the party
against whom the estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in a prior proceeding and that application of the doctrine
will notresult in an injustice ..."
Despite its adoption in other areas this "fairness" test was not ex-
tended to the field of patent law. 29 Courts generally adhered to the
Triplett mandate, and only one court flatly rejected the mutuality re-
quirement in a patent infringement case. 30
In the principal case the Court considered the continuing utility of the
mutuality rule as laid down by Triplett. The specific question was simi-
lar to the Rachal test: whether an unsuccessful patentee who has been
provided "a fair opportunity proceedurally, substantively and eviden-
tially to pursue his validity claim 3' should be given a second chance.
The reexamination of Triplett was prompted by two considerations.
First was the problem of crowded dockets. This condition could be
somewhat relieved by extending the preclusive defenses to more defen-
dants. Secondly was the special public interest in protecting patents.
These considerations necessitated an evaluation of the mutuality re-
quirement as it pertained to patent law. 32 The critical injury then was
whether the defenses could be extended without sacrificing fairness.3
These considerations were approached from three standpoints: the
peculiarities of patent litigation that militated against abandoning the
mutuality requirement; the economic consequences of Triplett; and the
burden on the courts that resulted from following Triplett. Basically, the
special problems of patent litigation were juxtaposed with the costs of
continued adherence to the mutuality doctrine.3 4
Two arguments had traditionally been posited to preclude abrogating
mutuality in patent cases. First, patents are impliedly sanctioned by the
27. 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970).
28. Id. at 62.
29. E.g., Bettis Rubber Co. v. Kleaver, 104 Cal. App. 2d 821, 233 P.2d 82 (1951) (the California
court followed Triplett despite the abandonment of mutuality in Bernhard).
30. Nickerson v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, 247 F. Supp. 221 (D. Del. 1965).
31. 402 U.S. at 333 citing Eisel v. Columbia Parking Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (D.C. Mass.
1960).
32. Id. at 328.
33. Id. at 329.
34. Id. at 330.
Vol. 1971: 658]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss4/7
662 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1971: 658
United States Constitution.35 This sanction has given rise to a legislative
presumption of validity to all patents. 31 Second is the complexity of
patent litigation.3 7 A consideration of these factors can lead to the con-
clusion that the public interest in patents should be protected from un-
sound adjudication. Obviously relitigation cannot be allowed against the
same defendant. However, the adverse effects of such a decision can be
limited if a patentee could sue any other infringer.
The Court rejected these arguments by asserting that some issues in
patent cases are not so difficult as to warrant reconsideration. These
issues can be considered conclusive.38 Furthermore the economic and
judicial costs of continued adherence to Triplett warrants some relaxa-
tion of the mutuality requirement.39
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
36. "A patent shall be presumed valid. The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent shall
rest on the party asserting it." 35 U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. 1968). Legislation providing an in rem
effect to a patent invalidity ruling has been considered but not adopted by Congress. This legislation
would not have effected the presumptive validity that initially attached to a patent, but once the
patent has been ruled invalid the presumption would have dissolved. S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 294 (1967).
37. In Learned Hand's opinion, "If there be an issue more troublesome. . . than. . . [validity
of patents], we are not aware of it." Harris v. Air King Products Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir,
1950).
38. Initially the Court recognized other areas of the law were just as complex as patent case,
e.g., negligence and scienter, 402 U.S. at 331. In addition, even conceding that patent cases were
difficult, a second litigation would not provide any assurance of increased accuracy. Id. But cf.
Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 644 (1936), where the Court mentioned that the existence of
conflicting decisions was a persuasive factor in their granting certiorari and thus review of the
invalidity ruling. See also Rollins, In Rem Invalidity: A Solution In Search of a Problem?, 52
J. PAT. OF. Soc'y 561, 574 (1970). 402 U.S. at 332. "In any event it can not be sensibly contended
that all issues concerning patent validity are so complex and unyielding." Conceding that patent
validity questions are exceedingly intricate, the Court noted that a plaintiff-patentee could choose
the time and court in which to litigate his claim. Thus he has ample opportunity to prepare his
case. In some cases a patentee would also be able to choose his opponent. Rollins, supra note
40, at 564. But see Vermont Structural Slate Co. v. Tatko Bros. Slate Co., 134 F. Supp. 4
(N.D.N.Y. 1955), affd 233 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 917 (1956) (patentee defended
claim in declaratory judgment action).
39. There are two aspects to the question of economic costs. First is the cost of relitigating a
patent invalidity ruling. There was ample evidence that the cost to both parties is considerable. The
Court felt that such expeditures are wasteful, 402 U.S. at 338. The Court, quoting Judge Frank,
said the expense of a patent litigation suit was staggering. Id. at 334. In addition there was evidence
from Congressional hearings that the approximate cost of a patent infringement suit was $50,000.
402 U.S. at 335; Rollins, supra note 38, at 562-63.
The second aspect of the economic costs question stems from a patent's presumptive validity.
This presumption remains despite a court ruling of invalidity. 402 U.S. at 338. But see Gold Seal
Importers, Inc. v. Westerman-Rosenberg, Inc., 133 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1943) (when issues before a
District Court are the same as those that were decided by the Circuit Court for that district, then
the Circuit Court's ruling is conclusive unless patentee offers new evidence). Faced with such a
Washington University Open Scholarship
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To insure that a patentee has been given a fair opportunity to litigate
his patent, the Court suggested certain claims he might assert to avoid
the conclusiveness of an invalidity ruling, e.g., choice of forum, incentive
to litigate and standard for obviousness.4"
Basically, therefore, the Court refused to recognize any overriding
interests so unique to patent law as to outweigh the adverse effects of
further adherence to Triplett. It seems futile to analyze this conclusion
since it fundamentally depends on the relative weights one believes
should be given each conflicting interest. Moreover, even though some
may disagree as to the appropriate weights, it can not be said the Court
is clearly wrong. A more useful analysis is directed toward the scope of
the decision and its importance to future cases.
The Blonder-Tongue opinion was narrowly drawn. The holding per-
tained only to patent law.4 Furthermore, its ambits were not extended
into "due process" or "offensive use" questions. 42 Nevertheless the deci-
sion raised problems in each of these areas.
By limiting the application of its decision to patent litigation, the
Court left unanswered the question of whether mutuality will be retained
presumption and the high costs of patent litigation, a businessman might choose to seek a license
rather than go to trial. 402 U.S. at 338-42. The court branded such settlements an anomoly within
our economic system. Id. at 343. The Court noted that a patent is a monopoly, and must be closely
scrutinized. Cf. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 825 (1948); Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541,544-45 (2nd Cir. 1942). Furthermore
the costs of these settlements are passed on to the consumer. 402 U.S. at 346.
In addition the Court did not think the expenses of determining the fairness of a prior validity
ruling were comparable to those of an infringement suit. Id. at 344-46. Thus, businessmen would
be less apt to be intimidated if they knew they could rely on the first judgment. In comparison, the
existing scheme provided encouragement only to those who could initially afford the expense of a
patent suit. The Court examined 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952), which permits a court to award attor-
ney's fees, and 35 U.S.C. § 288 (1952), which penalizes patentees who fail to make disclaimers,
and concluded that "neither of these provisions can operate until after litigation has occurred, and
the outlay required to try a lawsuit presenting validity issues is the factor which undoubtedly forces
many alleged infringers into accepting licenses rather than litigating." Id. at 347-48.
Another cost of adhering to Triplett is the burden on the judiciary. Despite the relatively small
amount of time devoted to patent relitigations, the Court applied an absolute standard-some time
will be saved by precluding relitigation. Id. at 348.
40. The Court posited the issue as whether the patentee had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
his claim. "Choice of forum" and "incentive to litigate" were given as examples of the types of
considerations trial courts should employ to determine whether a patentee had such an opportunity.
"Obviousness" claims would present unique problems to the second tribunal for it would have to
consider whether the proper standard had been employed in finding the patent void for obviousness,
whether the first court had been able to fathom the difficult subject matter involved in those claims,
and whether the patentee had been deprived of crucial evidence or witnesses, and if so whether the
deprivations were the patentee's own fault. 402 U.S. at 332-34.
41. Id. at 329.
42. Id. at 329-30.
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in other areas of the law. Blonder-Tongue can be read as a general
indictment of the mutuality requirement. The mutuality requirement
would probably have not been rejected in patent law if the removal of
mutuality in other areas of law had lead to undesirable results.4 3 On the
other hand, Blonder-Tongue also requires a case by case determination."
The holding is clearly not an absolute rejection of mutuality.
The Court also avoided the "due process" question. Basically, due
process prevents a litigant who never appeared in a prior action from
being estopped without litigating the issue.1 However, other due process
questions are also involved. The first question concerns what a patentee
must prove to avoid the preclusive effect of the earlier ruling." The
second question involves the extent to which preclusion is available. The
Court stated that, as long as the basic due process limitation is met,
when identical issues are raised, a prior invalidity ruling may be asserted
as conclusive.47 The determination of whether issues are identical was left
to the trial courts.
Finally, the holding in Blonder-Tongue was limited to allowing only
a defensive use of an invalidity ruling." Collateral estoppel will usually
be pleaded as a defense to an infringement claim. The holding leaves
unanswered the extent to which a prior ruling of invalidity may be
pleaded offensively against a patentee defendant. Given the apparent
adoption of the "fairness" test espoused in Rachal v. Hill, an offensive
use of a prior invalidity ruling would seem warranted in appropriate
circumstances."
43. The Court noted that the recent development in the doctrine of res judicata had "enhance[d]
the capabilities of the courts to deal with some issues swiftly but fairly." Id. at 327. It was also
noted that the lower courts had handled with considerable skill the problem of when to allow a
party who lacked mutuality to assert res judicata. Id. at 349.
44. Id. at 331.
45. Id. at 329.
46. The Court noted this difficulty and then relegated the solution to the lower courts. "In the
end, decision will necessarily rest on the trial court's sense of justice and equity." Id. at 334.
47. Identity of issue has been retained as a prerequisite for asserting resjudicata by those courts
that have abandoned the mutuality requirement. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 813, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942).
48. 402 U.S. at 330.
49- Offensive use questions center on the considerations of allowing a plaintiff in a second suit
to assert a judgment obtained by a different plaintiff in a prior suit against the same defendant. Id.
Although different policies are involved than in a defensive use situation (see Evans & Robins supra
note 25, at 188-90), some courts have allowed an offensive use when the defendant clearly had an
opportunity to litigate fully the issue in the prior proceedings; see, e.g., United States v. United
Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. & D. Nev. 1962), affd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds sub nom. United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 951 (1964).
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Three problems that the Court did not even mention in Blonder-
Tongue are particularly troublesome: First, if a ruling of validity is
followed by an invalidity ruling in a second suit, is the second determina-
tion controlling? Second, if an infringement claim is rejected for non-
infringement, would an additional ground of invalidity be considered
holding, or merely dictum, for the purposes of collateral estoppel? Lastly
does the new rule apply to a non-infringement ruling?
These questions are partially dependent on the ultimate scope given
the Blonder-Tongue decision. Some commentators have interpreted it as
giving an invalidity ruling an in rem effect. 0 This interpretation seems
unfounded. A clear difference exists between a prior ruling being conclu-
sive between appropriate litigants and being conclusive against the
world. The court in Blonder-Tongue clearly recognized this difference
and refused to adopt that approach. 5' The "fairness" test, therefore,
would seem to govern what effect prior invalidity rulings will be given
outside an infringement context as well as the scope of other rulings in
patent cases . 2
The Court in Blonder-Tongue brought patent law in phase with
other areas of law as regards res judicata, collateral estoppel and mu-
tuality. Although the holding presents many new problems, there are
established guidelines to their solution.5
3
The Court decided that no overriding policies warranted treating pat-
ent cases differently from other federal questions. Instead, it seems to
have adopted the "fairness" test of Rachal v. Hill. This test may result
in inconsistent applications of the Blonder-Tongue decision. Consistency
of application, however, should not be the standard to measure Blonder-
Tongue's success. Rather, the proper standard should be the extent that
it eliminates unnecessary patent litigation in federal courts.
50. Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts in Patent
Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REV. 633, 664 (1971).
51. "[W]e do not suggest, without legislative guidance, that a plea of estoppel by an infringement
or royalty suit defendant must automatically be accepted [provided the issues are identical]" 402
U.S. at 332-33. The phrase "without legislative guidance" is particularly important. The Court
specifically noted an attempt in 1967 to amend the patent laws to provide for an in rem determina-
tion of validity. The bills died in committee. Id. at 340-42 nn. 34-37. See also note 36 supra.
52. The Court specifically referenced royalty suits, 402 U.S. at 333.
53. See note 52 supra.
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